Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation by Peter Romaniuk

Author:Peter Romaniuk [Romaniuk, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, History & Theory, International Relations, General
ISBN: 9780415776486
Google: CC6JngEACAAJ
Goodreads: 8245957
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2010-01-15T11:19:30+00:00

Conclusion

The role of the UN in counter-terrorism cooperation since 9/11 manifests elements of both change and continuity from the pre-9/11 period. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, there has been a lot of activity in UN fora and, if measured quantitatively, multilateral counter-terrorism after 9/11 is historically exceptional. The qualitative attributes of cooperation over this period suggest more of a mixed record. The UN system has proven itself to be quite capable in certain aspects of counter-terrorism, especially concerning “preventive” measures. Of particular note here is the mobilization of UN mechanisms to elaborate norms and rules, and to provide or coordinate training, technical assistance, and other forms of capacity-building support. On the other hand, political quarrels are never too far away and manifest in different ways over time. The fact that the UN effort has advanced in fits and starts since 9/11 reflects that states waver between relative consensus and disunity fairly consistently.

What are we to make of this record? Not surprisingly, scholarship on the UN and terrorism has grown since 9/11.177 Some observers point to the essentially competitive nature of counter-terrorism diplomacy at the UN as a sign of continuity with the pre-9/11 period.178 Here, the apparent rivalry between the Security Council and the General Assembly on the issue is interpreted as an example of “forum shopping,” as states seek to advance their own interests through the UN.179 Others point to the self-correcting measures undertaken in UN fora—e.g. the Council’s integration of human rights into the work of CTED—to argue that the UN has learned from its missteps and shown flexibility in adapting its mechanisms to deal with the problem at hand.180 Indeed, whatever we might say about the political motivations of the states involved, the ability of the UN system to make successive adjustments and to change course reveals a nimbleness that challenges the stereo-typical view of the UN as a slow-moving and clunky bureaucracy.181 Perhaps, over time, the cluster of actors that comprise the UN system are realizing where their collective “comparative advantage” lies in the field of counter-terrorism, to recall the term used by the Secretary-General’s initial Policy Working Group in 2002.182 Indeed, that document, with its emphases on an international action plan, norm creation and capacity-building, stands up quite well in light of subsequent events.

What, then, of the future? The institutionalization of counter-terrorism across the UN system suggests that the organization will be occupied with it for some time hence. The question is “how?” The current debate concerns the role of an “operationalized” CTITF, and its responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Strategy. There is an argument for further rationalization of UN mechanisms here. For example, Eric Rosand claims that a “single counter-terrorism office or department should be established within the UN Secretariat once CTED’s mandate expires at the end of 2010.”183 This new unit would have oversight of 1373, 1624 and the Strategy, and would be well placed to leverage the benefits of the Secretariat’s regional offices. According to Rosand, consideration might also be given to consolidating the 1267 Monitoring Team and 1540 Expert Group into this unit.

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